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1Abstract
The focus of the paper is on issue-by-issue bargaining procedures in which parties
are allowed to diﬀer not only in their valuations of the issues but also in their rates
of time-preference. We show that the interplay of the forces in the bargaining game
is complex and standard assumptions in the literature, such as a common discount
factor, can be strong. We investigate the SPE of the game when the order of the issues
can be changed and show that parties can have the same preferences over agendas
when they both agree over the importance of an issue or when they disagree (if corner
solutions are allowed and/or there is a diﬃcult/urgent issue).
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, C73, C78.
Key words: Agenda, Bargaining, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper investigates multi-issue bargaining games in which players attempt to
divide each surplus (or cake) as in the standard alternating-oﬀer bargaining model
(Rubinstein, 1982). The bargaining is sequential, that is, negotiations over a second
surplus can start only after an agreement over the initial division has been reached
and the implementation of the agreement is sequential as well, that is, as soon as an
agreement is reached it can be implemented.
A similar framework has been investigated by Busch and Horstmann (1997, 1999),
Inderst (2000) and In an Serrano (2002, 2003). Their analyses conclude that parties
have conﬂicting preferences over agendas when they are restricted to choose among
sequential procedures and, as a result, a simultaneous procedure in which all the
issues are discussed at the same time is superior to any sequential procedure. In this
paper we show that parties can agree over which one is the best sequential procedure.
This consists in discussing the most important issue ﬁrst, if only interior solutions
are allowed, but agreement over agendas can arise even when parties have diﬀerent
evaluations of the issues (and corner solutions are allowed). Moreover, if there is a
diﬃcult issue (a deﬁnition is in section 4), parties can only agree in postponing such
an issue, both in the cases of corner and interior solutions and even when players do
not agree over the importance of the issues.
These results are based on the following key assumptions. First, parties are al-
3lowed to diﬀer not only in their evaluations of the issues, but also in their rates of time
preference. Moreover, after reaching an agreement over an issue there is an interval
of time before players attempt to reach an agreement over another issue1.I na n o t h e r
paper, Flamini (2001), we consider a similar framework, additionally, we allow side
payments. In other words, a party can make very large concessions at the initial
stage if his overall payoﬀ is non-negative. In this paper, we exclude side-payments
and, at most, a party can leave the entire surplus to his opponent. We investigate the
interplay of the forces in this game (with interior and corner solutions) and show that
parties can have the same preferences over sequential procedure. They can prefer the
same agenda not only when there is consensus over the importance of the issues (as
in the case of side payments), but also when they disagree over the importance of the
issues (and corner solutions are allowed).
These results are not obvious, since there are many diﬀerent strategic eﬀects that
parties need to take into account in choosing their strategies (key features are how
diﬀerent their relative and absolute valuations of the issues are and how diﬀerent their
time preferences are). As a result players may have diﬀerent incentives: a player may
prefer to postpone an issue if unimportant to him but important to his opponent,
or he may prefer to postpone an issue important to both parties if relatively more
1As Muthoo (1995) points out, in general, not only does this interval exist but it is often larger
than the interval of time between a rejection and a new proposal.
4important to his opponent. The incentives that player need to take into account may
work in opposite directions. However, we show under which conditions parties can
have the same preferences over agendas.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section speciﬁes the model. The
solution of the model and its properties are included in section 2.1. This section also
contains the analysis of the strategic eﬀects that characterised the game. In section
3.1, parties are ﬁrst allowed to negotiate according to a diﬀerent order of the issues,
then they form their preferences over agenda. In section 3, we show that there is an
eﬃcient agenda both when there is consensus over the importance of the issue and
when there is not. Section 4 focuses on the case of a diﬃcult/urgent issue.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider a two-stage bargaining game in which at each stage two players, named
i with i =1 ,2, attempt to divide a surplus. The bargaining game is sequential in
the sense that the second stage can start only once a division on the ﬁrst surplus
is agreed. In each stage, players bargain according to a standard alternating-oﬀer
procedure (Rubinstein, 1982). That is, time is discrete, t =0 ,1,..., at t =0 , player
1 can make an oﬀer to player 2 who can either accept or reject it. If player 2 rejects
it, then he can make a counter-proposal after an interval of time ∆ passes. If there
is an acceptance then the ﬁrst bargaining stage ends. We assume that an interval of
5time τ passes between the end of the ﬁrst bargaining stage (an acceptance) and the
beginning of a new bargaining stage (a new proposal). Moreover, the ﬁrst proposer
at the second stage is the last responder at the initial stage. Player i’s rate of time
preference is indicated by ri > 0 (and i =1 ,2). To take into account that there are
intervals of time of diﬀerent lengths, we deﬁne players discount factors as follows:
player i’s within-cake discount factor δi =e x p ( −ri∆) applies after a rejection and his
between-cake discount factor αi =e x p ( −riτ) applies after an acceptance. Moreover,
players are allowed to have diﬀerent valuations of the issues. A positive parameter
λi indicates the relative importance of cake i to player i (see payoﬀ functions below),
with i =1 ,2.
The implementation of the agreement is assumed to be sequential, that is, a
division is implemented as soon as it is agreed. If an agreement is not reached on the
partition of a cake, players get zero payoﬀs( d i s a g r e e m e n t )a tt h a ts t a g e . T h e n ,i f
disagreement takes place at the ﬁrst stage, the second stage cannot take place and
players’ overall payoﬀs are zero. In our framework, we consider two agendas, agenda
i states that cake i is negotiated ﬁrst, with i =1 ,2. In this section we focus on
agenda 1.I f ,a f t e rt rounds, an agreement is reached on the division of the ﬁrst cake,
(x,1−x), where x is the share player 1 obtains, and after n+1periods (a period of
length τ and n periods of length ∆) another agreement is reached (1−y,y), then the
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Our technical assumption is as follows. Let λ2 ≤ λ2 ≤ λ2 where
λ2 =
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This assumption allows us to simplify the presentation. This is not a restrictive
assumption since in the most interesting case in which some frictions tend to disappear
(i.e., ∆ → 0), these bounds tends to include the entire positive real range (i.e., λ2 → 0
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For α1 that varies between the boundaries2 f ≤ b ≤ g ≤ a, we can deﬁne diﬀerent
SPE demands. There are at most three SPE with immediate agreement (when 0 <
2The assumption λ2 ≤ λ2 implies that b ≤ g. When the frictions within the bargaining stage
tends to disappear, ∆ → 0,f= b and g = a.
7b<g<1). These are described in the following proposition. Some of these SPE do
not exist if some of the boundaries do not belong to the3 interval (0,1).
Proposition 1 Let λ2 ≤ λ2 with i =1 ,2, then there is a unique SPE in which
the agreement is reached immediately over the partition of every single cake. At the
second stage, parties play as in the RBM. At the ﬁr s ts t a g e ,t h ee q u i l i b r i u md e m a n d
of player 1 (2)i sx1 (y2, respectively), as deﬁned in the following three cases.
1) If 0 ≤ α1 ≤ b, then the equilibrium demands at the ﬁrst stage are x1 =1and
y2 = e y2 ∈ (0,1),d e ﬁned below
e y2 =
(1 − δ1)[(1 − δ1δ2)λ1 + α1(1 + δ1)(1 − δ2)]
λ1(1 − δ1δ2)
(3)
Then the equilibrium payoﬀs are as follows:
v1 =







2) If b ≤ α1 ≤ g, the equilibrium demands are deﬁned in (6) and (7) below
x1 =
(1 − δ2)[(1 − δ1δ2)λ1 +( 1− δ1)(α2λ1λ2(1 + δ2) − δ2α1(1 + δ1))]
λ1(1 − δ1δ2)2 (6)
y2 =
(1 − δ1)[(1 − δ1δ2)λ1 +( 1− δ2)(α1(1 + δ1) − α2λ1λ2δ1(1 + δ2))]
λ1(1 − δ1δ2)2 (7)
3For instance, if b<0, then the ﬁrst equilibrium speciﬁed in the proposition below does not
exist.
8and the equilibrium payoﬀs are as follows:
v1 =
1 − δ2




[(1 − δ1δ2)(λ1 + α1)+( δ1 − δ2)(α1 − α2λ1λ2)] (9)
3) If g ≤ α1 ≤ 1, the equilibrium demands are y2 =1and x1 = e x1 ∈ (0,1),w h e r e
e x1 =
(1 − δ2)[1 − δ1δ2 + α2λ2(1 − δ1)(1 + δ2)]
(1 − δ1δ2)
(10)
and the equilibrium payoﬀs are as follows:
v1 =




δ2[1 − δ1δ2 + α2λ2(1 − δ1)]
1 − δ1δ2
(12)




















The solution of the system (13) are the demands x1 and y2 deﬁn e di n( 6 )a n d( 7 )
above. It can be shown that x1 > 0 if and only if α1 <aand x1 < 1 if and only if
α1 >b .Similarly, y2 > 0 if and only if α1 >fand y2 < 1 if and only if α1 <g .It is
straightforward to see that f ≤ b and g ≤ a. Then, there is an intersection between
the interval [b,a] and [f,g] if and only if g>b ,that is λ2 ≤ λ2. Under this condition we
can distinguish three sections on the α1 axis. First, when 0 ≤ α1 ≤ b, the equilibrium
9demands are x1 =1and y2 = e y2,w h e r ee y2, deﬁn e di n( 3 )i ss u c ht h a tp l a y e r1i s
indiﬀerent between accepting the demand e y2 o rr e j e c t i n gi tt od e m a n dx1 =1 . Since
α1 ≤ b and λ2 ≤ λ2, e y2 < 1.S e c o n d ,w h e nb ≤ α1 ≤ g, then the solution of the system
(13) is given by the demands in (6) and (7), since these are interior, they are SPE
demands. Third, when g ≤ α1 ≤ 1, the equilibrium demands are y2 =1and x1 = e x1,
where e x1, deﬁned in (10) is such that player 2 is indiﬀerent between accepting the
demand e x1 or rejecting it to demand y2 =1 . Following standard arguments (see for
instance, Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990), it can be shown that these solutions deﬁne
au n i q u eS P E .
The equilibrium speciﬁed above has interesting characteristics. First of all, play-
ers’ demands in equilibrium are complicated functions of the parameters of the model
and typical results obtained in the context of bargaining over a single cake (for in-
stance a more patient player obtains a larger utility), may not exist in this game. The
following corollary presents some comparative statics. These results are immediate
consequences of Proposition 1. A discussion of these results follows.
Corollary 1 The equilibrium outcome deﬁned in Proposition 1, part 2, is char-
acterised by the following:
1) if α1 increases, x1 decreases, v1 increases (decreases) if δ1 >δ 2 (δ1 >δ 2
respectively) and v2 increases;
2) if α2 (or λ2)i n c r e a s e s ,x1 increases, v1 increases and v2 increases (decreases)
10if δ2 >δ 1(δ2 <δ 1 respectively);
3)i f λ1 increases, x1 increases, v1 increases and v2 decreases;
4) if δ1 increases, v1 increases (decreases) if
(1+α2λ2)δ2λ1(1−δ1δ2)+(α1−α2λ1λ2)(1−δ
2
2+δ2(δ1−δ2)) > 0(< 0 respect.) (14)
while v2 decreases (increases) if
−(1 + α2λ2)λ1(1 − δ1δ2) − 2(δ1 − δ2)(α1 − α2λ1λ2) < 0( > 0 respect.) (15)
5) if δ2 increases v1 decreases (increases) if
[2(δ1 − δ2)(α2λ1λ2 − α1) − (1 − δ1δ2)(λ1 + α1)] < 0( > 0 respect.) (16)
while v2 increases (decreases) if
(α1 + λ1)(1 − δ1δ2)+( α1 − α2λ1λ2)(δ1 − δ2 − δ2(1 − δ
2
1)) > 0( < 0 respect.) (17)
The equilibrium outcome deﬁned in Proposition 1, part 3, is characterised by the
following:
6) if α1 increases, v1 increases while e x1 and v2 remain unchanged;
7) if α2 (or λ2)i n c r e a s e s ,e x1, v1 and v2 increase;
8)i f λ1 increases, v1 increases, while v2 and e x1 remain unchanged;
9) if δ1 increases, e x1 and v2 decrease, while v1 increases (decreases) if
α1 − α2λ1λ2(1 − δ
2
2) > 0(< 0 respect.) (18)




2)−2δ2)]+α1δ1(1−δ1) > 0( < 0 respect.) (19)
Corollary 1 does not include a discussion of the ﬁrst equilibrium deﬁn e di np r o p o s i t i o n
1, since this is strictly related to the outcome of a standard one-cake bargaining game
(given that player 1 is able to extract the entire surplus at the initial stage). Corollary
1 shows that the interactions of the discount factors (αi,δj) are an important feature of
the interplay of forces in this game. When the between-cake discount factor increases
for the ﬁrst mover (α1), that is, player 1 discounts less strongly the payoﬀ obtained
in the second stage, this is not always good news for such a player (see point 1 of
Corollary 1). First of all, player 1 makes a larger concession at the ﬁrst stage (x1
decreases) to facilitate the initial agreement. Obviously, player 2’s payoﬀ increases
when he obtains a larger share of the ﬁrst division. However, player 1’s payoﬀ, v1,
increases only if, in the within-stage negotiations, player 1 is more patient than his
opponent (δ1 >δ 2). In other words, player 1’s concession at the ﬁrst bargaining stage
is too large if he fears a rejection more than his opponent does. This is an interesting
feature of the bargaining game since being more patient is often associated with a
higher payoﬀ, but in this game this is not necessarily true, it depends on the link
between the within-cake discount factors.
A similar eﬀect on the equilibrium outcome can also be shown when, in the
between-stage negotiations, the ﬁrst responder becomes more patient (α2 increases,
12see point 2 of Corollary 1). Given the structure of the game under agenda 1, the
parameters α2 and λ2 play exactly the same role under this agenda. When we con-
sider the equilibrium demand e x1 deﬁned in (10) the eﬀects are all unambiguous. In
particular, an increase the between-cake discount factor α2 (or the parameter λ2)
has a positive eﬀects on both players’ payoﬀs, regardless of players’ rates of time
preference. Instead, the eﬀect of an increase in the relative importance of cake 1 to
player 1 (λ1) is unambiguous both in the case of corner solutions and in the case of
interior solutions. For the latter, player 1 is better oﬀ s i n c eh ei sa b l et oe x t r a c ta
larger share at the ﬁrst division (point 3 of Corollary 1). In other words, if the ﬁrst
issue becomes relatively more important to player 1, he is able to extract a larger
share at this stage. Again for the case of corner solutions (point 8 of Corollary 1),
the parameters interact in a less complicated way, in particular e x1 is unchanged but
obviously player 1 is better oﬀ.
The eﬀects of a change in the within-cake discount factor δi on players’ payoﬀs
highlight much more complex relationships among the parameters (even for the case of
corner solutions). Indeed, these eﬀects depend not only on the relationship between
players’ time preferences but also on players’ valuations of the second bargaining
stage. To be more precise, the eﬀect of δ1 on player 1’s payoﬀ is positive when player
1 is more patient than his opponent (δ1 >δ 2) and he values the second bargaining
s t a g em o r et h a nh i so p p o n e n td o e s ,t h a ti s ,α1/λ1 ≥ α2λ2 (see points 4 of corollary
131). Under these conditions also the other eﬀects of δj on vi (with i,j =1 ,2) is as
in the standard one-cake bargaining theory, that is, negative for i 6= j, and positive
otherwise4. When these conditions are relaxed, the eﬀects of the δi on equilibrium
payoﬀs may be ambiguous (see points 4 and 5 of corollary 1). For the case of corner
solutions, we can obtain similar eﬀects as in the standard single-cake bargaining game
when player 1 values the second bargaining stage more than his opponent does, that
is, α1/λ1 ≥ α2λ2 (see points 9 of corollary 1) either he is more impatient than his
opponent (expression (19) is negative if δ1 <δ 2) or the interval of time between an
acceptance and a new proposal goes to zero (again (19) is negative for ∆ → 0).
A common assumption in the literature is to assume that parties have the same
discount factors δi = δ, with i =1 ,2, in this case the interplay of the forces in the
bargaining process with SPE deﬁned by part 2 of proposition 1 is greatly simpliﬁed.
As a result player i’s payoﬀ does not depend on αi with i =1 ,2. Moreover, player 2’s
payoﬀ is also independent of his relative valuation of cake 2 (λ2), while the relative
importance of the ﬁr s tc a k eb e t w e e np l a y e r sλ1 still plays a role (as indicated in point
3 of Corollary 1). For the equilibrium outcome deﬁned by the demand e x1 (deﬁned in
(10)) the assumption of a common discount factor does not have a great impact on
the interplay of the forces, since this is already simpliﬁe db yt h ef a c tt h a tap l a y e r
4The eﬀect of δ2 on v2 is negative, since α1 + λ1 >α 1 − α2λ1λ2 and 1 − δ1δ2 >δ 1 − δ2 ≥
δ1 − δ2 − δ2(1 − δ
2
1).
14asks for the entire surplus at the initial stage.
To investigate further the subtle eﬀects of the parameters on the equilibrium
outcome of the bargaining game we focus on the case in which the interval of time
between a rejection and a new proposal, ∆, tends zero.
Corollary 2 Under the conditions speciﬁed in Proposition 1, in the limit as ∆
tends to zero, that is, for λi > 0 and for α1 that varies in the intervals with extremes




λ1(2α2λ2r2 − (r1 + r2))
2r2
, gl ≡ lim
∆→0
g =
λ1(2α2λ2r1 + r1 + r2)
2r1
there is a unique SPE in which the agreement is reached immediately over the partition
of every single cake. At the second stage, player i demands the Rubinsteinian share
(
rj
r1+r2 with i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j) while in the ﬁr s ts t a g et h eS P Ed e m a n d sb yp l a y e r
1a n d2r e s p e c t i v e l ya r ea sf o l l o w s .
1) If 0 ≤ α1 ≤ bl, then the equilibrium demands at the ﬁrst stage are x1 =1and
e yl
2 ≡ lim∆→0 e y2 =0 .
2) If bl ≤ α1 ≤ gl, the equilibrium demands are deﬁned in (6) and (7) below
lx1 =
r2[(r1 + r2)λ2 +2 r1(α2λ1λ2 − α1)]
λ1(r1 + r2)2 (20)
ly2 =
r1[(r1 + r2)λ1 +2 r2(α1 − α2λ1λ2)]
λ1(r1 + r2)2 (21)
15and the equilibrium payoﬀs are as follows:
lv1 =
r2




[(r1 + r2)(1 + α1λ1)+( r2 − r1)(α1 − α2λ1λ2)] (23)
3) If g ≤ α1 ≤ 1, the equilibrium demands are y2 =1and x1 = e xl
1 ≡ lim∆→0 e x1 =
0.
Corollary 3 For riτ small with i =1 ,2, demand lx1 deﬁned in (20) is strictly
increasing (decreasing) in τ when r1 >r 2λ1λ2 (r1 <r 2λ1λ2, respectively), payoﬀ lv1
is strictly decreasing (increasing) in τ when r1 <r 2(1 + 2λ1λ2) (r1 >r 2(1 + 2λ1λ2)
respectively) and lv2 is strictly decreasing (increasing) in τ when r2 <r 1(2 + λ1λ2) (
r2 >r 1(2 + λ1λ2) respectively).
Proof. When riτ is small, the between-cake discount factor αi can be approximated
by 1 − riτ. The results then follow directly from Corollary 2.
In Corollary 3 the focus is on the SPE demands deﬁned by interior solutions, since
for the other cases the demands are extreme (simply 0 or 1). When the interval of time
∆ tends to zero, obviously we can re-establish some of the results of the comparative
statics presented in corollary 1 (with reference to −ri rather δi). However, as Corollary
3 shows, additional eﬀects on the equilibrium outcome can be highlighted in the case
of small interval of time (for ∆ that tends to zero and riτ is small). First of all, if
the interval τ increases, that is, the future payoﬀs are discounted more strongly by
b o t hp l a y e r s ,a n dp l a y e r sh a v et h es a m er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e( r1 = r2), then, as
16one would expect, both players are worse oﬀ (since the frictions to reach the second
bargaining stage increase). More interestingly, the eﬀect on the SPE initial division
is more subtle. The share that player 1 obtains at the ﬁrst stage lx1 decreases, if the
relative importance of cake 1 to player 1, λ1, is larger than the relative importance
o fc a k e1t op l a y e r2 ,1/λ2 (and vice-versa). In other words, player 2 is able to
obtain a more proﬁtable initial agreement when he minds relatively less about the
initial issue and despite the fact that player 1 minds more about the initial issue is
unable to extract a larger surplus. The intuition is that when player 2’s relatively
more important issue is discussed second and the payoﬀs obtained at the second
bargaining stage are discounted more strongly, he is able to play in a "tougher" way
at the initial stage.
When players have diﬀerent time preferences, some of the previous eﬀects are
reversed. In particular a player could obtain a larger payoﬀ when the frictions (τ)
increase. Let player 1 be more patient than player 2 (r1 <r 2)t h e np l a y e r1o b t a i n sa
smaller share at the initial division, when the relative importance of cake 2 to player
1i sl a r g e rt h a nt h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo fc a k e2t op l a y e r2( i . e . ,1/λ1 >λ 2). Under
these circumstances the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ei n t e r v a lo ft i m eτ on player 2’s
payoﬀ is ambiguous. Indeed, there is a trade-oﬀ, on one hand, player 2 is worse oﬀ
since the payoﬀ obtained from future negotiations are discounted more strongly when
τ increases; on the other hand, player 2 is better oﬀ since he can get a larger share at
17the initial bargaining stage when r1 <r 2λ1λ2. The overall eﬀects of an increase in τ
on player 2’s payoﬀ is positive only if player 1 is suﬃciently more patient than player
2( r1 <r 2/(2 + λ1λ2)), in other words, the initial concessions are suﬃciently large.
3 Changing the Order of the Issues
In this section, the focus is on agenda 2, in which the ﬁrst issue is represented by
cake 2. We then show what incentives parties need to take into account in forming
their preferences over agendas. Let
n =







2)α2 − λ2δ2(1 − δ1δ2)]




2)α2δ1 − λ2(1 − δ1δ2)]
λ1λ2(1 + δ1)(1 − δ2)
,q=




As for the analysis of agenda 1, for α1 that varies between the boundaries p ≤ o ≤
q ≤ n, we can deﬁne diﬀerent demands in SPE with immediate agreement. These are
at most three.
Proposition 2 Let λ2 º λ2 with i =1 ,2, then there is an SPE in which the agree-
ment is reached immediately over the partition of every single cake. At the second
s t a g e ,p a r t i e sp l a ya si nt h eR B M .A tt h eﬁrst stage, the equilibrium demand of player
1 (2)i sx1 (y2, respectively), as deﬁned in the following cases.
1) If 0 ≤ α1 ≤ o, the equilibrium demands are x1 =1and y2 = e y2 ∈ (0,1),d e ﬁned
18below:
e y2 =
(1 − δ1)[1 − δ1δ2 + α1λ1(1 + δ1)(1 − δ2)]
(1 − δ1δ2)
(24)
Then the equilibrium payoﬀs are as follows:
u1 =







2) If o ≤ α1 ≤ q, the equilibrium demands are deﬁned in (27) and (28) below
x1 =
(1 − δ2)[(1 − δ1δ2)λ1 +( 1− δ1)(α2λ1λ2(1 + δ2) − δ2α1(1 + δ1))]
λ1(1 − δ1δ2)2 (27)
y2 =
(1 − δ1)[(1 − δ1δ2)λ1 +( 1− δ2)(α1(1 + δ1) − α2λ1λ2δ1(1 + δ2))]
λ1(1 − δ1δ2)2 (28)
and the equilibrium payoﬀs are as follows:
u1 =
1 − δ2
λ2(1 − δ1δ2)2[(λ2 + α2)(1 − δ1δ2)+( α2 − α1λ1λ2)(δ2 − δ1)] (29)
u2 =
δ2(1 − δ1)
(1 − δ1δ2)2[λ2(1 + α1λ1)(1 − δ1δ2)+( α2 − α1λ1λ2)(δ2 − δ1)] (30)
3) If q ≤ α1 ≤ 1, the equilibrium demands are y2 =1and x1 = e x1 ∈ (0,1),w h e r e
e x1 =
(1 − δ2)[(1 − δ1δ2)λ2 + α2(1 − δ1)(1 + δ2)]
(1 − δ1δ2)λ2
(31)
and the equilibrium payoﬀs are as follows:
u1 =
(1 − δ2)[λ2(1 − δ1δ2)+α2(1 + δ2)(1 − δ1)+α1δ1λ1λ2]
λ2(1 − δ1δ2)
u2 =
δ2[λ2(1 − δ1δ2)+α2δ2(1 − δ1)]
1 − δ1δ2
19Proof. The proof follows the same reasoning as in Proposition 1.
The interplay of the forces in this game is similar to the ones deﬁned for Agenda
1, with the only diﬀerence that now the ﬁrst issue is represented by cake 2 rather
than 1. To show which incentives are the dominant ones we look at the case in which
parties can form preferences over agendas.
3.1 The Best Agenda
Whenever the diﬀerences in player i’s payoﬀs vi−ui (with vi and ui deﬁn e di nP r o p o -
sition 1 and 2) for i =1 ,2, have the same sign, players prefer the same agenda. In the
following proposition we show that the best agenda exists both in the case in which
there is consensus over the importance of the issues, and in the case in which parties
have diﬀerent preferences over issues.
Proposition 3 In sequential bargaining procedures, there is consensus over agendas.
When players demand interior solutions in both agendas, then the best agenda consists
in setting the most important issue ﬁrst, assuming that a player is characterised
by a suﬃciently small αi. When at least one player demands an extreme share in
equilibrium, then consensus over agenda can arise also when parties have diﬀerent
preferences over issues.
Proof. The proof consists in analysing the sign of the diﬀerences vi − ui for any i.
Since each equilibrium payoﬀ vi and ui can assume at most three values, according
20to the value that αi assumes (see Proposition 1 and 2), then we need to consider the
following seven cases:
1) In both agendas the SPE outcome is that player 1 demands the entire surplus
(that is, αi < min{b,o}). In this case, player 1 prefers agenda 1 (2 respectively) if
(λ1 − 1)(1 − δ1δ2 − α1δ1(1 − δ2))
1+δ1δ2
> 0(< 0, respect.) (32)
while player 2 prefers Agenda 1 if
α2(1 − δ1)(1 − λ2)
1+δ1δ2
> 0(< 0, respect.) (33)
At the limit for ∆ → 0, expression (32) is positive when λ1 > 1. Then both players
prefer the agenda that sets the most important issue ﬁrst (e.g., agenda 1 if λ1 > 1
and λ2 < 1).
2) In both agendas the SPE outcome is that player 1 demands the interior solution
of the system of indiﬀerence condition (that is, max{b,o} <α i < min{g,q}). In this
case, agenda 1 is preferred by player 1 when (34) below is positive and vice-versa





2 −1)(1+δ2)α2(1−δ1)+λ2(λ1 −1)(1−δ1δ2 +α1(δ2 −δ1))] (34)






1λ2)(1+δ1)α1(1−δ2)+λ1(1−λ2)(1−δ1δ2 +α2(δ1 −δ2))] (35)
21W i t h o u tl o s so fg e n e r a l i t y ,l e tc a k e1r e p r e s e n tt h em o s ti m p o r t a n ti s s u e( λ1 > 1 and
λ2 < 1), then if the between-cake discount factor of one player αi is suﬃciently small,







(1 − δiδj + αj(δi − δj))
(1 + δi)(1 − δj)
(36)
the Pareto superior agenda consists in discussing the most important issue ﬁrst (see
Flamini 2001 for details).
3 )I nbo t ha g e n d at h eS P Eo u t c o m ei st h a tp l a y e r1d e m a n d se x1 (that is, max{g,q} <
αi < 1). Then, at the limit for ∆ → 0, the diﬀerences vi − ui are as follows




v2 − u2 =
(1 − λ2)(r1 + r2(1 − α2))
r1 + r2
(38)
Then, we can conclude that players who are suﬃciently patient prefer to put the most
important issue ﬁrst.
4) In agenda 1 player 1 demands the interior solution x1, but in agenda 2 he
obtains the entire surplus (i.e., b<α i <o ). T h e n ,a tt h el i m i tf o r∆ → 0, the
diﬀerence v1 − u1 is as follows
λ1((1 − α1)r2(r1 + r2)+2 r1r2λ2α2) − (r1 + r2)2 − α1r2(r1 − r2)
(r1 + r2)2 (39)
while v2 − u2 becomes
r1[λ1λ2α2(r1 − r2)+λ1(r1 + r2)(1 − α2)+2 α1r2
(r1 + r2)2λ1
(40)
22In this case, if r1 >r 2, that is, player 1 is more patient than player 2, then player 2
always prefers agenda 1 (even for λ2 > 1), while player 1 has the same preferences
when λ1 is suﬃciently large, so that expression (39) is positive. In other words,
players can agree over agendas even when they do not agree over the importance of
the issues.
5) In agenda 1 player 1 demands the entire surplus, while in agenda 2 he obtains
the interior solution x1 (i.e., o<α i <b ). Then, at the limit for ∆ → 0, the diﬀerence
v1 − u1 is as follows
λ1λ2((r1 + r2)2 + α1r2(r1 − r2)) − λ2r2(r1 + r2)(1 − α1) − 2α2r1r2
(r1 + r2)2λ2
(41)
while v2 − u2 is the following:
−r1[2α1r2λ1λ2 + λ2(r1 + r2)(1 − α2)+α2(r1 − r2)]
(r1 + r2)2 (42)
When r1 >r 2, player 2 always prefers agenda 2, while player 1 has the same preference
only if λ1λ2 is suﬃciently small. That is, player 2’s relative valuation of cake 1 is
larger then player 1 (λ1 < 1/λ2). In this case, it does not matter what is the important
issue, only the product λ1λ2 is relevant.
6) Player 1 obtains e x1 in agenda 1 and the interior demand x1 in agenda 2. In
this case, at the limit for ∆ → 0, player 1 prefers agenda 1 if
r2
λ1λ2α1(r1 − r2) − λ2(r1 + r2)(1 − α1) − 2α2r1
(r1 + r2)2λ2
> 0 (43)
23while player 2 prefers agenda 1 if
−
2λ1λ2α1r1r2 + r1λ2(r1 + r2)(1 − α2) − (r1 + r2)2 + α2r1(r1 − r2)
(r1 + r2)2 > 0 (44)
In this case if r1 >r 2 and λ1λ2 is suﬃciently large players have diﬀerent preferences
over agendas.
7) Player 1 obtains the interior demand x1 in agenda 1 and e x1 in agenda 2. Then,
at the limit for ∆ → 0, player 1 prefers agenda 1 if
r2[2λ1λ2α2r1 + λ1(r1 + r2)(1 − α1)+α1(r1 − r2)]
(r1 + r2)2 > 0 (45)
while player 2 prefers agenda 1 if
−λ1λ2((r1 + r2)2 + α2r1(r2 − r1)) + λ1r1(r1 + r2)(1 − α2)+2 α1r1r2
(r1 + r2)2λ1
> 0 (46)
Then, for instance if r1 <r 2 player 1 always prefers agenda 1, while player 2 has the
same preference only if λ1λ2 is suﬃciently small.
Proposition 3 establishes an intuitive result on the eﬃciency of sequential proce-
dures: when there is an important issue, this should be discussed ﬁrst. However, this
result is not obtained in frameworks similar to ours (such as, Busch and Horstmann,
1997, 1999, Inderst, 2000 In and Serrano, 2002, 2003). In addition, proposition 3
shows that other incentives can be dominant. For instance, regardless of whether an
issue is the most important or not, a player may prefer either an agenda where he gets
a positive share in the initial agreement (see, e.g., case 4 in proof of Proposition 3) or
24an agenda where the issue that is valued relatively more strongly by his opponent is
postponed (see, e.g., case 5 in proof of Proposition 3). Indeed, an important feature of
t h eb a r g a i n i n gg a m et h a ta ﬀects parties’ preferences over agendas is that concessions
can be made only at the negotiations on the ﬁrst issue (before the second has been
settled) and these concessions can be large or small depending on the diﬀerence in
the relative importance of an issue, not simply on the value of the importance of an
issue.
In some cases, more than one incentive work in the same direction. For instance,
if players have opposite preferences over issues (e.g., λi = λ with i =1 ,2), then
the incentive to put the most important issue ﬁrst and the incentive to postpone
the rival’s most important issue coincide. However, when players have the same
preferences over issues (e.g., λ1 > 1 and λ2 < 1), the incentive to put the most
important issue ﬁrst is in contrast with the incentive to postpone the rival’s most
important issue. Proposition 3 shows that both incentives can be dominant (and
under which conditions).
In conclusion, the key elements in deﬁning players’ preferences over agendas are
not only the value of the importance of an issues (is λi larger or smaller than 1?),
but also their diﬀerence (is λ1λ2 larger or smaller than 1?), players’ between-cake
discount factors and in general their rates of time preferences.
254U r g e n t / d i ﬃcult issue
In this section we assume that one issue is diﬃcult in the sense that a rejection of
a proposal regarding this issue may lead to the negotiations breaking down. For in-
stance, in a peace process there can be an issue characterised by this feature, similarly,
in the bargaining between a buyer and a seller there can be a diﬃcult item. In these
cases, what are the driving forces in the bargaining games and as a consequence, how
should the agenda be set?
To investigate this case we modify the model described in section 2 in two ways.
First, we assume that there is no time lapse between bargaining stages (τ =0 ), this is
a simplifying assumption (the result below can be re-established when τ is positive).
Second, the parameter α now represents the probability of game continuation after a
rejection of a proposal regarding the diﬃcult issue, say cake 1. In other words, after
a rejection of a proposal regarding the division of cake 1, not only does the discount
factor δi apply but also the probability of game continuation α, while after a rejection
regarding the proposal of cake 2, only the discount factor δi applies. This does not
imply that cake 1 also represents the most important issue. The importance of an
issue still depends on the parameters λi with i =1 ,2 as in the model described in
section 2. When there is a rejection in the bargaining stage related to the division of
cake 1, it is as if players are characterised by a smaller discount factor, δiα (rather
than δi). In other words, cake 1 represents an urgent issue in the sense that the
26bargaining round related to the division of cake 1 is longer than the bargaining round
in which players attempt to divide cake 2. Bearing in mind this double interpretation,
we derive the players’ preferences over agendas among the issue-by-issue procedures
in the presence of a diﬃcult/urgent issue.
Moreover, to simplify the presentation, we focus on the case in which players are
symmetric and that some frictions tend to disappear (ri = r,λi = λ for i =1 ,2
moreover, ∆ → 0).
Proposition 4 In agenda 1, for ∆ → 0, the SPE demands are as follows:
le x1 =
(2 + λ)(1 − α)
2
, ly2 =1 (47)
for
√






2 +2 λ − α
2λ(1 + α)
, ly2 =









α(1 + α) and
lx1 =1 , le y2 =










2 − αδ)(1 − αδ
2)+λ(1 + δ)(1 − αδ)




λ(1 + δ)(1 − αδ)+( 1− αδλ
2)(1 − αδ
2)
λ(1 + δ)(1 − α2δ
2)
(51)
27To simplify let’s assume that λ<1. Then the demand x1 belongs to (0,1) for r3 <
α<r 1, with
r3 =
(1 + λ)(1 + δλ) −
√
∆r3
2δ(λ + δλ+ δ)2 ,r 1 =





∆r1 =1 − 4δ







∆r3 =( 1 + δ
2λ
2)(1 + λ
2)+2 λ(1 − λ
2 − λ(1 + δ
2)+δ(1 + λ)) (54)
Moreover, r1 tends to 1 for δ → 1 while r3 can be larger than 1 for λ close to 1 and
δ<0.5.W h e nα is smaller than r3, then the SPE demand is a corner solution x1 =1 .
When α is larger than r1 (however, this case is not interesting for δ → 1), then we
have a corner solution of the system of indiﬀerence conditions and x1 =0 . For λ<1,
the demand y2 deﬁned in (51) is always positive, however, it will be also larger than
1 unless λ is close to 1 and α is suﬃciently large for δ large.












the demand lx1 is in (0,1) for
√
1+α − 1 <λ<α+
p
α(1 + α). Moreover, for
λ<
√
1+α − 1, then lx1 < 0 while for λ>α+
p
α(1 + α), then lx1 > 1.T h e















α , ly2 < 0. Let α>1/3, then, since
0 <
√
1+α − 1 <
p









the SPE demands are as deﬁn e di np r o p o s i t i o n4 ,w h e r et h ed e m a n dle x1 and le y2
by player 1 and 2 respectively are such that the responder is indiﬀerent between
accepting or rejecting the proposal so as to demand the entire surplus.
Similarly in agenda 2 where cake 2 is shared ﬁrst the SPE is characterised by the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 In agenda 2, for ∆ → 0, the SPE demands are as follows: if λ<1,
player demands the entire surplus, while player 2 demands a share ag2e y2 =
λ(1−α)
1+α .
If λ>1, player 2 demand the entire surplus, while player 1 demands the share
ag2e x1 = 1−α
(1+α)λ.




2)+λ(1 − δ)(1 + αδ)




λ(1 − δ)(1 + αδ)+( λ
2 − δ)(1 − αδ
2)
λ(1 + αδ)(1 − δ
2)
(58)
These are SPE demands if they are in (0,1). At the limit for ∆ → 0, the demands
ag2x1 and ag2y2 in (57) and (58) tends to sgn(1−λ)∞ and sgn(λ−1)∞ respectively.
This implies that the SPE demands in agenda 2 are as follows: if λ<1, player 1
demands x1 =1w h i l eP l a y e r2d e m a n d sas h a r ee q u a lt oag2e y2 where ag2e y2 is such
29that player 1 is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting this oﬀer so as to demand
for the entire surplus:
ag2e y2 = lim
∆→0
(1 − αδ






On the other hand, if λ>1, player 2 demands y2 =1while player 1 demands a share
equal to ag2e x1 where ag2e x1 is such that player 2 is indiﬀerent between accepting and
rejecting this oﬀer so as to demand for the entire surplus:
ag2e x1 =l i m
∆→0
(1 − αδ






We can now show that when there is a diﬃcult/urgent issue, parties prefer to
postpone it and to agree over the easy issue ﬁrst, even if this is not very important.
Proposition 6 When there is a diﬃcult/urgent issue, parties can only agree in post-
poning such an issue regardless of its importance.
Proof. Let’s assume α>1/3, given the SPE demands in Agenda 1, we distinguish
5c a s e s :
A) Let 0 <λ<λ GR,w h e r eλGr =
√
α(1+α)−α
α , in this case in agenda 1 Player
1d e m a n d s
(2+λ)(1−α)
2 , while in Agenda 2 player 1 obtains the entire surplus. In this
case player 1 obtains a larger payoﬀ i na g e n d a1i fλ is suﬃciently large (at the




1−α2 ), otherwise, he prefers agenda 2.
30Similarly player 2 prefers agenda 1 when λ is suﬃciently large (at the limit λ>λ Re
with λRe =
α(1+a)−1
α(1+α) ), otherwise, he prefers agenda 2. Since in this case λ cannot be
larger than λGR, then both players prefer agenda 2 if 0 <λ<min{λYe,λ Re,λ GR}
(see ﬁg. 1) otherwise players have diﬀerent preferences over agendas.
Agreement arises only for 0 <λ<min{λYe,λ Re,λ GR}
B) Let λB <λ<1, with λB =
√
α(1+α)−α
α , then Player 1 demands x1 as in (55)
while in Agenda 2 player 1 obtains the entire surplus. Player 1 prefers agenda 1 if
λ>λ G with λG = −(1−a)+
√
2+a2 and agenda 2 otherwise, while Player 2 always





31for λB <λ<1 and α>0.5 players never agree over agenda, while for α<0.5 and
max{λB,λ Y} <λ<λ G (see ﬁg. 2) both players prefer agenda 2.
Agreement arises for max{λB,λ Y} <λ<λ G
C) Let 1 <λ<α+
p
α(1 + α), then in agenda 1 player 1 demands x1 as for case
B), while in agenda 2 in equilibrium player 1 obtains ag2e x1 as deﬁned in (60). In this
case, since λ>1, it is straightforward to show that player 1 always prefers agenda 1
while player 2 always prefers agenda 2.
D) Let λ>α+
p
α(1 + α), then player obtains the entire surplus in agenda 1 and
32ag2e x1 as deﬁned in (60) in agenda 2. Then, as for the previous case, player 1 prefers
agenda 1 while player 2 prefers agenda 2.
In conclusion, as in the case of side payments (Flamini, 2001) when there is a dif-
ﬁcult/urgent issue parties prefer to postpone it and enjoy an initial agreement rather
than to compromise the entire negotiation process by setting the most diﬃcult/urgent
issue ﬁrst.
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